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Showing posts with label Rest Periods. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Rest Periods. Show all posts

Monday, June 13, 2011

Appellate Court Afirms $187 Million Verdict Against Wal-Mart In Meal And Rest Period Case

MSNBC reports today that a Pennsylvania appellate court affirmed a $187.6 Million verdict against Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., in a class action lawsuit for allegedly denying hourly employees meal and rest breaks.  Although the appellate court affirmed the damages verdict, it did order the trial court to recalculate the $45.6 Million award of attorneys fees to the employees' attorneys, indicating the trial court erred by "double-counting" some factors when calculating the attorney's fees award. Click here to read the story. 
Meal and rest period cases continue to be a significant source of potential exposure for employers large and small.  Employers concerned about such potential exposure should consider consulting experienced employment law counsel about strategies for reducing potential meal and rest period liability.  Among other things, having in place appropriate written meal and rest period policies and documenting the company's adherence to those policies is often the best defense to meal and rest period claims. 

Friday, February 25, 2011

Court of Appeal Holds Attorney's Fees Are Not Recoverable For Claims For Meal Or Rest Period Violations

By Christopher S. Andre and Scott K. Dauscher 

Not every cloud has a silver lining, but some do, and the California Court of Appeal's decision today in Thomas McGann v. United Parcel Service, Inc., contains a terrific silver lining for employers.  Thomas McGann was employed by United Parcel Service, Inc., ("UPS") for a number of years and worked as an On Road Supervisor.  UPS classified Mr. McGann as an exempt employee and therefore did not pay Mr. McGann premium pay (i.e., overtime pay) for hours worked in excess of eight hours in a workday.

Mr. McGann filed suit against UPS alleging six causes of action: (1) failure to pay overtime pursuant to Labor Code sections 510 and 1194, (2) failure to provide meal periods and rest periods pursuant to Labor Code section 226.7, (3) failure to provide compliance wage statements pursuant to Labor Code sections 226 and 226.3, (4) common law conversion premised on the theory Mr. McGann had a property interest in the premium pay he alleged UPS owed to him but failed to pay to him, (5) injunctive and other equitable relief, and (6) unfair competition pursuant to Business and Professions Code section 17200, et seq. 

UPS prevailed on all six of Mr. McGann's causes of action, and the trial court made an award of attorney's fees and costs in favor of UPS.  Mr. McGann appealed the award of attorney's fees and costs.

On appeal, in a somewhat paradoxical decision, the court reversed the trial court's award of attorney's fees in favor of UPS and affirmed the trial's court's award of costs to UPS.  The Court of Appeal held UPS was not entitled to an award of prevailing party attorney's fees because Labor Code section 1194 permits only an award of attorney's fees to an employee who prevails on a claim for alleged unpaid minimum wages or overtime compensation and does not permit an award of prevailing party attorney's fees to an employer that defeats such a claim.  The Court of Appeal held, also, that there was no basis for the trial court to award prevailing party attorney's fees to UPS as to Mr. McGann's other claims because no statute permits such an award.

The Court of Appeal's decision to affirm the award of costs to UPS is good news for employers, but it is not the silver lining alluded to above.  The silver lining alluded to above is the court's holding the prevailing party attorney's fees provisions of  Labor Code section 218.5 do not apply to claims for additional compensation under Labor Code 226.7 for an employer's alleged failure to provide required meal periods and/or rest periods.   In Murphy v. Kenneth Cole Productions, Inc. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1094, the California Supreme Court held the additional compensation to be awarded to employees under Labor Code section 226.7 when an employer fails to provide required meal periods and/or rest periods is more akin to a wage than a penalty and was therefore subject to a three-year statute of limitations and not the one-year statute of limitations applicable to statutory penalties.  Based on that decision, it was widely believed that the prevailing party attorney's fees provisions of Labor Code section 218.5 for claims for unpaid wages other than minimum wages or overtime wages applied to claims for additional compensation under Labor Code section 226.7 for meal and/or rest period violations.  However, in today's decision, the Court of Appeal held the additional compensation payable under Labor Code section 226.7 is more like a wage than a penalty for purposes of determining which statute of limitations applies to such claims, as the Supreme Court held in Murphy, but not sufficiently like a wage to be subject to the prevailing party attorney's fees provisions of Labor Code section 218.5. 

This is a terrific silver lining for employers.  It means employees who are determined to be the prevailing parties on claims for an employer's failure to provide required meal periods and/or rest periods are likewise not entitled to an award of attorney's fees based on such claims and such claims are very, very commonly asserted in wage and hour class action lawsuits.  But there is more.  Because the Court of Appeal held the additional compensation payable under Labor Code section 226.7 is not sufficiently like a wage to be subject to the prevailing party attorney's fees provisions of Labor Code section 218.5, it follows that claims for such non-wage additional compensation cannot be the basis for an award of "waiting time" penalties under Labor Code section 203 because section 203 provides for an award of "waiting time" penalties only when there has been a "willful" failure to pay wages due and owing at the time of termination. 

Given the amount of the attorney's fees award at state (approximately $100,000) and other considerations, we doubt UPS will petition the California Supreme Court for review of today's decision, and it is not immediately clear that there would be a viable basis for Mr. McGann to petition for review of today's decision.  The more likely risk to today's decision would be a request by the plaintiff's bar or by labor unions to depublish the decision so it becomes unciteable.  We will monitor this issue and will report any further significant developments. 

Wednesday, February 16, 2011

Court Of Appeal Doubles Potential Exposure For Meal And Rest Period Claims

Labor Code section 226.7 states that if an employer fails to "provide" an employee a meal period or a rest period in accordance with an applicable Industrial Welfare Commission wage order, "the employer shall pay the employee the employee one additional hour of pay at the employee's regular rate of compensation for each work day that the meal or rest period is not provided."
In our experience, many if not most judges and most attorneys have understood Labor Code section 226.7 to mean the employer could be liable for one such penalty per workday regardless of how many rest periods or meal periods the employer failed to "provide" to an employee during a single workday, and, before today, there was no reported California decision to the contrary.
Today, in United Parcel Service, Inc. v. Superior Court, the Court of Appeal held Labor Code section 226.7 "permits up to two premium payments per work day."  In other words, the court held Labor Code section 226.7 authorizes the recovery of up to two additional hours of compensation per workday per non-exempt employee where the employer is found to have failed to "provide" in a workday both  one or more meal periods and one or more rest periods.  The court held Labor Code section 226.7 is reasonably susceptible to two contrary interpretations and therefore relied greatly on legislative history to reach its conclusion that up to two section 226.7 penalties can be recovered per workday per employee.  The court states as follows:"[w]e conclude, based upon the wording of section 226.7, subdivision (b), the legislative and administrative history of the statute and IWC wage orders, the public policy behind the statue and wage orders, and also the principle that we are to construe section 226.7 broadly in favor of protecting employees, that the employees in this case may recover up to two additional hours of pay on single work day for meal period and rest period violations -- one for failure to provide a meal period and another for failure to provide a rest period."
Today's decision also potentially opens the door to various derivative claims that might be based on an alleged failure to pay to an employee two Labor Code section 226.7 penalties when the employer fails to provide both one or more meal periods and one or more rest periods in a workday.  For example, if an employer fails to pay two such penalties when they are required, that could open the door to claims the employer failed to provide fully complaint wage statements as required by Labor Code section 226 by failing to accurately state all wages earned during a pay period by failing to reflect all required 226.7 payments during a pay period and could open the door to claims the employer is liable for Labor Code section 203 "waiting time" penalties because the employer ailed to pay to employees who quit or who are terminated all wages due and owing, which would include any required Labor Code section 226.7 penalties, which the California Supreme Court holds are wages. 
Today's decision further underscores the need for employers to have in place compliant meal period and rest period policies and practices. 

Thursday, June 24, 2010

New Court of Appeal Decision Potentially Helpful To Employers Opposing Class Certification Of Wage And Hour Claims


Today, in Faulkinbury v. Boyd & Associates, Inc., the California Court of Appeal issued a decision that might prove helpful to employers opposing motions for class certification of wage and hour claims.  The court reiterated that it is the plaintiff(s)' burden to show his or her claims are susceptible to common proof (i.e. proof of alleged liability common to all of the purported class members) and that a defendant employer "'may defeat class certification by showing that an affirmative defense would raise issues specific to each potential class member and that the issues presented by that defense predominate over common issues.'" 

In general, non-exempt employees must be provided at least one unpaid, duty-free meal period of at least 30 minutes each workday.  An additional unpaid, duty-free meal period may be required if an employee works more than 10 hours in a workday.  The Industrial Welfare Commission wage orders permit an employer to instead provide a paid on-duty meal period "when the nature of the work prevents an employee from being relieved of all duty and when by written agreement between the parties an on-the-job meal period is agreed to."

The plaintiffs in the case were employed as security guards who worked at numerous different locations.  They alleged, among other things, that the employer improperly required them to agree to paid on-duty meal periods, contending that the nature of their work did not prevent them from being relieved of all duty (i.e., that they should have been provided unpaid, duty-free meal periods instead of paid, on-duty meal periods).  The plaintiffs alleged also that they were not authorized and permitted to take all required rest periods and that the employer improperly calculated their overtime rates of pay. 

The trial court denied class certification, finding that common issues of law and fact did not predominate over individualized issues. 

The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's decision as to plaintiffs' meal period claims and as to plaintiffs' rest period claims, holding that the trial court correctly applied the law as to those claims and holding that the trial court's rulings as to those claims were supported by substantial evidence. 

The Court of Appeal was persuaded that the evidence in the record sufficiently showed that common issues of law and fact would not predominate over individual issues because there was no common proof showing whether or not the requirements for a valid on-duty meal period were or were not satisfied as to any particular security guard employee.  As to the plaintiffs' rest period claim, the Court of Appeal was persuaded that the declarations the employer submitted by employees stating they were authorized and permitted to take all required rest periods was substantial evidence supporting the trial court's conclusion that common issues of law and fact did not predominate over individualized issues because those declarations showed a lack of common proof as to whether the security guard employees were or were not authorized and and permitted to take all required meal periods. 

However, the Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's denial of class certification of plaintiff's claim that the employer incorrectly calculated the applicable overtime rates of pay because its calculations did not include annual bonus payments and other forms of alleged compensation provided to the security guard employees.  The Court of Appeal held that claim was susceptible to common proof because the claim could be determined based on the employer's payroll records.  In other words, the employer either correctly calculated the rate of overtime pay or it did not.  This part of the decision is still potentially helpful to employers because the Court of Appeal emphasized that the claim should have been certified because it was susceptible to common proof, and we believe many common wage and hour claims are in fact not susceptible to common proof.